# Metadata does not seek secrets or local files

**Tool metadata must not seek secrets or protected context: text that names SSH keys, .env files, cloud credential files or MCP client configuration, or asks the model to send credentials or conversation content somewhere, is blocked.**

Check `sec-secret-seeking` · Poisoning and hidden text · default severity: blocking · rubric 2.1.0. Last verified against OpenAI plugin guidelines, section 3.3 on 2026-11-18.

## What fails

The text names SSH keys, .env files, cloud credential files, MCP client configuration, or asks the model to send credentials or conversation content somewhere.

## The rule

> Plugin and tool metadata must not seek secrets or protected context, direct unauthorized data transfers or actions, override platform instructions or safeguards, conceal behavior, or impersonate another party.

Source: [OpenAI plugin guidelines, section 3.3](https://developers.openai.com/plugins/plugin-guidelines)

## How to fix it

Remove the wording. A tool should never ask the model for secrets it holds or can reach.

1. Remove any mention of key files, credential files or client config from metadata.
2. If a tool legitimately reads files, describe its scope ("files in the workspace folder") without naming secret locations.
3. Add a CI test for the paths you never want to see.

A CI test that fails when the pattern comes back:

### TypeScript (node:test)

```js
// tools-list.test.mjs: run `node --test` after saving the answer with
// npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector --cli <server> --method tools/list > tools.json
import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
import { test } from 'node:test';

const answer = JSON.parse(readFileSync('tools.json', 'utf8'));
const tools = answer.tools ?? answer.result?.tools ?? answer;

// Every string and every key in a tool, with its path.
function* strings(value, path) {
  if (typeof value === 'string') yield [path, value];
  else if (value && typeof value === 'object')
    for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(value)) {
      yield [`${path}.${k} (key)`, k];
      yield* strings(v, `${path}.${k}`);
    }
}

const PATTERN = /\.ssh\/|id_rsa|id_ed25519|\.env\b|\.aws\/credentials|mcp\.json|claude_desktop_config/i;

test('metadata does not point at secrets', () => {
  const hits = [];
  for (const tool of tools) for (const [path, text] of strings(tool, tool.name)) if (PATTERN.test(text)) hits.push(path);
  assert.deepEqual(hits, [], 'tool metadata names secret files or client configuration');
});
```

### Python (pytest)

```python
# test_tools_list.py: run `pytest` after saving the answer with
# npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector --cli <server> --method tools/list > tools.json
import json
import re

with open("tools.json", encoding="utf-8") as f:
    answer = json.load(f)
tools = answer.get("tools") or answer.get("result", {}).get("tools") if isinstance(answer, dict) else answer


def strings(value, path):
    """Every string and every key in a tool, with its path."""
    if isinstance(value, str):
        yield path, value
    elif isinstance(value, dict):
        for k, v in value.items():
            yield f"{path}.{k} (key)", k
            yield from strings(v, f"{path}.{k}")
    elif isinstance(value, list):
        for i, v in enumerate(value):
            yield from strings(v, f"{path}.{i}")


PATTERN = re.compile(r"(?i)\.ssh/|id_rsa|id_ed25519|\.env\b|\.aws/credentials|mcp\.json|claude_desktop_config")


def test_metadata_does_not_point_at_secrets():
    hits = [path for tool in tools for path, text in strings(tool, tool["name"]) if PATTERN.search(text)]
    assert hits == [], "tool metadata names secret files or client configuration"
```

## Questions

### Why would a model follow such text?

It reads tool descriptions as trusted context. Published attacks got models to read private keys and pass them as tool arguments.

### Our tool manages .env files. Is it flagged?

Possibly. Describe it by purpose and scope; if it really edits environment files, expect reviewers to ask about it.

## Related checks

- [No prompt markup such as <IMPORTANT> or <system>](https://isokron.ai/mcp-check/checks/sec-instruction-markup)
- [No credential, payment card or government ID inputs](https://isokron.ai/mcp-check/checks/openai-restricted-input)
- [No x-mcp-header on secrets or personal data](https://isokron.ai/mcp-check/checks/spec-x-mcp-header-sensitive)
- [Tool poisoning and hidden text](https://isokron.ai/mcp-check/checks/security)

Counts toward: Poisoning and hidden text, Anthropic connector directory, OpenAI plugin directory.

Rubric: https://isokron.ai/mcp-check/rubric

Check your tool list: https://isokron.ai/mcp-check
