# No bidirectional override characters

**Bidirectional embedding, override and isolate controls (U+202A to U+202E, U+2066 to U+2069) make text display in a different order than it is read, so a reviewer sees one thing and the model another.**

Check `sec-bidi-controls` · Poisoning and hidden text · default severity: blocking · rubric 2.1.0. Last verified against OpenAI plugin guidelines, section 3.3 on 2026-11-18.

## What fails

Bidirectional embedding, override and isolate controls (U+202A to U+202E, U+2066 to U+2069) make text display in a different order than a model reads it, so a reviewer sees one thing and the model another.

## The rule

> Encoded or obfuscated instructions do not exempt a plugin from these requirements.

Source: [OpenAI plugin guidelines, section 3.3](https://developers.openai.com/plugins/plugin-guidelines)

## How to fix it

Remove the characters. "Copy fixed tool list" strips them.

1. Strip the characters from every string in the tool list.
2. Keep right-to-left text (Arabic, Hebrew) without explicit overrides: plain text renders correctly.
3. Add a CI test that fails on them.

A CI test that fails when the pattern comes back:

### TypeScript (node:test)

```js
// tools-list.test.mjs: run `node --test` after saving the answer with
// npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector --cli <server> --method tools/list > tools.json
import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
import { test } from 'node:test';

const answer = JSON.parse(readFileSync('tools.json', 'utf8'));
const tools = answer.tools ?? answer.result?.tools ?? answer;

// Every string and every key in a tool, with its path.
function* strings(value, path) {
  if (typeof value === 'string') yield [path, value];
  else if (value && typeof value === 'object')
    for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(value)) {
      yield [`${path}.${k} (key)`, k];
      yield* strings(v, `${path}.${k}`);
    }
}

const PATTERN = /[\u202A-\u202E\u2066-\u2069]/u;

test('no bidirectional override characters', () => {
  const hits = [];
  for (const tool of tools) for (const [path, text] of strings(tool, tool.name)) if (PATTERN.test(text)) hits.push(path);
  assert.deepEqual(hits, [], 'bidirectional override characters in tool metadata');
});
```

### Python (pytest)

```python
# test_tools_list.py: run `pytest` after saving the answer with
# npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector --cli <server> --method tools/list > tools.json
import json
import re

with open("tools.json", encoding="utf-8") as f:
    answer = json.load(f)
tools = answer.get("tools") or answer.get("result", {}).get("tools") if isinstance(answer, dict) else answer


def strings(value, path):
    """Every string and every key in a tool, with its path."""
    if isinstance(value, str):
        yield path, value
    elif isinstance(value, dict):
        for k, v in value.items():
            yield f"{path}.{k} (key)", k
            yield from strings(v, f"{path}.{k}")
    elif isinstance(value, list):
        for i, v in enumerate(value):
            yield from strings(v, f"{path}.{i}")


PATTERN = re.compile(r"[\u202A-\u202E\u2066-\u2069]")


def test_no_bidirectional_override_characters():
    hits = [path for tool in tools for path, text in strings(tool, tool["name"]) if PATTERN.search(text)]
    assert hits == [], "bidirectional override characters in tool metadata"
```

## Questions

### Is this the "Trojan Source" problem?

The same mechanism: bidi controls reorder what is displayed. In code it hides logic from reviewers; in tool metadata it hides text from them.

### Does right-to-left text need these characters?

Normally no. The Unicode bidi algorithm orders plain Arabic or Hebrew text correctly without explicit controls.

## Related checks

- [No invisible Unicode tag or variation-selector characters](https://isokron.ai/mcp-check/checks/sec-invisible-encoding)
- [No zero-width or other invisible characters](https://isokron.ai/mcp-check/checks/sec-zero-width)
- [No control characters in metadata](https://isokron.ai/mcp-check/checks/sec-control-chars)
- [Tool poisoning and hidden text](https://isokron.ai/mcp-check/checks/security)

Counts toward: Poisoning and hidden text, Anthropic connector directory, OpenAI plugin directory.

Rubric: https://isokron.ai/mcp-check/rubric

Check your tool list: https://isokron.ai/mcp-check
